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Do Tax Judges Think About the Economy?
Orli Oren-Kolbinger*
Does the macroeconomic environment affect judicial decisions and
thereby shape the law? Even though the normative significance of
understanding judicial decision-making is undeniable, empirical research
into how judges make decisions is woefully incomplete. This is the first
Article to empirically examine the stabilizing fiscal potential of judicial
decisions in tax disputes. In this Article, I use empirical methods to test
whether macroeconomic conditions—namely, the business cycle—affect the
outcomes of judicial decisions in tax cases. Economic theory prescribes
either an anti-cyclical response to the business cycle or no response at all. I
test this hypothesis with a novel dataset constructed of judicial decisions
made by specialized tax judges from the district courts of Israel before and
after the 2008 financial crisis. The evidence suggests business cycles affect
judges’ decisions in tax disputes. But counter to the theoretical prediction,
judges favor the tax authorities during economic downturns and favor the
taxpayers during economic upturns. This pro-cyclical decision-making
pattern may exacerbate economic instability.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars, economists, and social scientists have extensively
studied how nonlegal factors affect judicial decision-making. A question
that has not yet received much empirical attention is whether
macroeconomic conditions affect judges’ decisions in the context of tax
disputes and court litigation. Judicial decisions in tax cases have fiscal
consequences and therefore have the potential to act as institutional fiscal
stabilizers. Thus, there is great value in researching the relationship
between macroeconomic variables—namely, the business cycle—and
judicial decisions at the micro level.1 This is especially the case given
that fluctuations in economic stability are practically inevitable. This
study fills this gap in the literature.
Macroeconomic theory focuses on aggregated market processes. It
suggests potential solutions—in the form of market interventions made
by central institutions—to market difficulties, including the
1. A similar claim can be made regarding other tax institutions, such as the tax authorities. This
article, however, focuses on the courts.
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macroeconomic phenomenon of the “business cycle.” The business cycle
consists of four consecutive stages: (1) recession, which is a slowdown
of economic activity; (2) trough, which is a negative peak of economic
activity; (3) expansion, which is an acceleration of economic activity; and
(4) peak, which is a positive peak of economic activity. This cycle
describes irregular and unpredictable fluctuations in economic activity
over time, resulting in gross domestic product (GDP) instability. Periods
of recession and expansion reflect this instability.2 The cyclicality of
business cycles, meaning their magnitude and length, is not consistent
over time. Economists can positively identify changes in the business
cycle only after some time has passed since the initial change occurred.
Importantly, however, identification methods are not uniform and vary
among economists.
Economists commonly disagree on the theoretical grounds of the
business cycle phenomenon. There appears to be no clear normative
recommendation regarding how the government, or any other central
institution, should respond to fluctuations in the business cycle, and
whether a response is needed at all. Classical economic theories suggest
no response is needed. The Keynesian theory, however, recommends an
anti-cyclical stabilizing response.3 Assuming a response to the business
cycle is the desired path, the two governmental institutional means of
intervention to promote economic stabilization are monetary policy and
fiscal policy.4 Monetary policy consists of the management of the money
supply in the market.5 Fiscal policy consists of government expenditures
and tax revenue.6
This Article focuses on revenue policy within fiscal policy, specifically
the tax system. The tax system is a powerful fiscal tool and has the
potential to function as a countercyclical stabilizer. Stabilizing tax policy
is comprised of (1) the time lag between identifying the problem and
passing the legislation and between passing the legislation and the
2. N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 258 (7th ed., 2010).
3. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs, 63 AM.
ECON. REV. 326, 326–27 (1973); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Macroeconomic Priorities, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 11 (2003); Jeff Strnad, Some Macroeconomic Interactions with Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU
L. REV. 171, 173–78 (2003); RICHARD G. LIPSEY & K. ALEC CHRYSTAL, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 418, 460, 470, 472 (9th ed., 1999); Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Time to
Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1345, 1360 (1982); John B. Long Jr. &
Charles I. Plosser, Real Business Cycles, 91 J. POL. ECON. 39, 43–46 (1983); Robert G. King &
Charles I. Plosser, Money, Credit, and Prices in a Real Business Cycle, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 363,
378 (1984); Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum, Current Real Business Cycle Theories
and Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 430, 430–31 (1992).
4. See, e.g., RUDIGER DORNBUSCH ET AL., MACROECONOMICS (11th ed., 2010); LIPSEY &
CHRYSAL, supra note 3; Strnad, supra note 3, at 173.
5. MANKIW, supra note 2, at 547–56.
6. DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 4, at 206.
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policy’s actual influence on the business cycle; and (2) the degree of
discretion in operating stabilizing measures. The characteristics of a
stabilizing tax policy vary across the different stabilization tools.
From a legal perspective, the tax system has two forms of stabilization:
ad hoc legislation and automatic stabilizers. The main advantage of ad
hoc legislation, such as enacting a law to lower tax rates as a response to
a recession, is the design of a tailored response to particular economic
conditions. This process involves a significant amount of discretion on
the part of policymakers. Oftentimes, however, it takes too long to
accomplish the desired fiscal result through ad hoc legislation. On the
other hand, the tax system can respond to fluctuations in the business
cycle automatically. When the tax base, commonly in the form of profits,
shrinks during a recession, the tax burden subsequently decreases. Even
so, automatic responses may be less accurate because changes in salaries
are not always aligned with the business cycle. While the quicker,
automatic response to macroeconomic instability may be more effective,
a slower, discretionary response might be more accurate.
Scholars have used macroeconomic analysis to analyze, understand,
and design legal rules and institutions, including in the taxation context.7
More specifically, empiricists focused on tax legislation, tax reforms, and
the effect of automatic and discretionary stabilizers. These same
empiricists, however, often do not consider judicial decisions and their
ability to effectively implement tax legislation.8 The potential
macroeconomic role of the courts has not been discussed—at least, not
enough—in the long-term public and academic debate over
macroeconomic policy. One welcome exception is Yair Listokin, whose
articles and recent book discuss the potential macroeconomic role of the
courts to implement tax legislation that acts as a response to variations in
the business cycle.9
Judges can react faster than the legislature while still exercising
discretion through individualized court decisions. These decisions

7. Yair Jason Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy Through the Income Tax Code, 123 TAX NOTES
1, 1–2 (2009) [hereinafter Listokin 2009]; Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The
Importance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. REG. 45, 56–57, 60
(2012) [hereinafter Listokin 2012]; Joy Sabino Mullane, Perfect Storms: Congressional Regulation
of Executive Compensation, 57 VILL. L. REV. 589, 622–24 (2012); see also infra Part I providing
additional examples.
8. See examples in Part I.
9. YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS 15–20,
156, 159–60, 162, 186–97 (2019) [hereinafter LISTOKIN 2019]; see, e.g., Yair Listokin, Law and
Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions, 34 Y. J. REG. 791, 837–39 (2017). I
engage further with Listokin’s work in a separate work-in-progress, that builds on my current
empirical findings and offers a normative perspective on the potential role of tax judges during
economic crisis.
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frequently carry fiscal implications.10 Furthermore, because judges
regularly make determinations regarding the outcome of cases, the
stabilizing effect of their decisions has the potential to be immediate.
Even if it takes the legislature and the judges the same amount of time to
identify the stage in the business cycle, a judicial decision is often reached
more quickly and efficiently than the typical legislative process.
Moreover, the judicial decisions often result in the immediate
implementation of the decision. This is in contrast to the typical
legislative process which may delay the implementation of such policies.
In this study, I assess whether judges who decide civil income tax
disputes respond to the business cycle, and if so, how they respond. In
other words, do business cycles affect judicial decision-making in cases
that bear fiscal consequences? If so, do judges respond in a way that may
potentially stabilize the business cycle? By doing so, I provide the first
step in the analysis of the stabilization potential of tax institutions. I test
these questions using regression analysis. I offer several ways of coding
the main independent variable, the business cycle, which consider the
way judges identify it.
The main empirical finding from this data set is counterintuitive and
surprising. The empirical analysis suggests that business cycles not only
seem to affect judges’ decisions in tax disputes, but they also seem to
manifest in decisions that have a destabilizing and pro-cyclical effect on
the economy. Counter to the theoretical prediction, judges favor the tax
authorities during economic downturns and favor the taxpayers during
economic upturns. This decision-making pattern on the part of judges
may exacerbate economic instability, which is the opposite of the desired
outcome according to Keynesian theory.
This result has several normative implications. First, when judges
employ macroeconomic policy of any kind in their decision-making
process, they act as quasi-legislators. But judges are not appointed to act
as legislators. What are the jurisprudential and separation of powers
implications of judges implementing macroeconomic policy? Second,
what should be the required level of macroeconomic proficiency of
judges for reaching informed stabilizing decisions that would not harm
the economy? Third, what cooperation mechanisms are available to the
legislature and the judiciary to promote economic stability? And fourth,
is a stabilizing fiscal response even desirable for resolving downturns in
the business cycle? An empirical-positive foundation is necessary to
better address these normative questions and concerns. This Article lays
10. Although tax cases may represent a small fraction of total tax disputes, judicial decisionmaking in tax cases directly affects legal results outside of court. This also affects taxpayers’
incentives. I refer to this idea again in Section II.A.
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out the initial foundation required in order to consider the greater
normative discussion.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I focuses on the tax system
as a fiscal stabilizer. Part II sets forth the theory that underlies my
hypotheses in this study, according to which judges respond to
macroeconomic fluctuations when deciding tax cases and may act as
fiscal stabilizers. Part III describes the methodology I used in this study,
detailing primarily the method I used to code the business cycle variable
in this context and in the research hypotheses. Part IV presents the results,
and Part V discusses the results. Then, I offer concluding remarks on how
these findings contribute to the larger normative discussion.
I. THE STABILIZING POWER OF THE TAX SYSTEM
The tax system is a dominant and forceful fiscal tool. As such, it
functions as a potential countercyclical fiscal stabilizer. Aligned with
Keynesian macroeconomic theory, levying taxes lowers available
income, which in turn, lowers the aggregate demand and the product level
in the market. Conversely, lowering taxes increases the available income,
which increases the aggregate demand and the product level in the
market.11
The tax system defines the tax base and tax rates, which together
determine the tax burden. It also includes tax expenditures12—e.g.,
deductions, credits, exemptions, preferential tax rates, and allowances for
tax deferral—which lower tax collection. Thus, these expenditures act as
a substitute for direct government spending.13 The tax system also defines
the tax base—meaning, what activities are subject to taxation—and tax
rates. Together the tax base and the tax rate determine the tax burden—
meaning, the taxes owed.
A stabilizing tax policy is composed of two primary aspects: (1) the
11. See Listokin 2009, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that changes in tax policy can have a larger
stabilizing effect than the size of the change itself, because of the “Keynesian Multiplier Effect.”
This way, even when the product level goes up, the income level will not rise in the same rate,
because of taxes; and vice versa); see MANKIW, supra note 2, at 292–95 (finding that increasing
government purchasing leads to higher income, causing higher consumption); see also WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 225 (11th ed., 2009)
(addressing government transfer payments as the opposite of taxes and a way to add to earned
income); see also Listokin 2012, supra note 7, at 51–53 (describing the Keynesian multiplier effect
as having a larger stabilizing or destabilizing effect than government officials expect).
12. Several examples of tax expenditures are the deduction of health insurance costs incurred
by the employer, earned income tax credit (EITC), and the deduction of charitable contributions.
See, e.g., Credits and Deductions for Individuals, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions-for-individuals [https://perma.cc/795J-PSLW] (last visited
Nov. 31, 2020).
13. See Listokin 2012, supra note 7, at 60–61 (finding that the government can either fund
health insurance or allow for a deduction of health insurance costs, so taxable income is lower).
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time lag between identifying the problem and the policy’s actual
influence, and (2) the degree of discretion in operating stabilizing means,
meaning whether it is an automatic stabilizer or a discretionary stabilizer.
These characteristics vary across the different stabilization tools. The
general notion regarding stabilization is that there is a tradeoff between
the degree of discretion and the speed of the response to macroeconomic
instability. In other words, while the swifter automatic response will
generally be more effective, a slower discretionary response might lead
to a more accurate stabilizing outcome.14
The tax system has two forms of stabilization: ad hoc stabilizing
legislation and automatic stabilizers. An ad hoc response is the enactment
of tax laws in response to the macroeconomic environment. Automatic
stabilizers are tax laws initially designed to respond to the
macroeconomic environment without the need for further legislation or
policymaking.15
Ad hoc tax stabilizing legislation can establish and change tax rates
and the tax base in a stabilizing manner. In other words, the legislature
has the ability to raise or lower tax rates and to expand or narrow the tax
base to promote fiscal stabilization. Changes to tax rates and the tax base
are means of discretionary stabilization because their enactment requires
a governmental act. The primary advantage of ad hoc legislation is that it
allows for the tailoring of the response depending upon the corresponding
stage of the business cycle.16 The process of implementing tax legislation
involves discretion and experts’ deliberation over the characterization of
the business cycle and the desired fiscal response. Therefore, a
discretionary response is potentially more accurate.
On the other hand, the primary shortcoming of discretionary fiscal
legislation is the time it takes to implement and achieve the desired fiscal
result. This time lag consists of: (1) the time spent identifying the
appropriate stage in the business cycle;17 (2) the time it takes to design
14. Listokin 2009, supra note 7, at 4–5; Listokin 2012, supra note 7, at 55.
15. Milton Friedman, A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability, 38 AM. ECON.
REV. 245 passim (1948); Robert M. Solow, Rethinking Fiscal Policy, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 509, 509–14 (2005).
16. See LISTOKIN 2019, supra note 9, at 16 (“But macroeconomic considerations should dictate
legal decisions only when the decision will clearly increase spending and when the
macroeconomically desirable legal ruling requires little sacrifice of other legal goals, such as
equity.”).
17. Historically, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determined the peak and
trough dates of the business cycles approximately six to twenty-one months after that date, even
though “there is no fixed timing rule.” The NBER uses macroeconomic indicators such as real
GDP, employment, and real income to identify the stages of the business cycle. See Business Cycle
Dating,
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH., http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html
[https://perma.cc/M9HJ-DPLA] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020); The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating
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and pass the legislative response, which may be prolonged as a result of
political or technical reasons;18 and, (3) the time between the initial
implementation and initial results are seen. Consequently, by the time the
legal response is implemented, oftentimes it no longer stabilizes the
business cycle. This results in unintended destabilizing effects that might
worsen the recession or expansion.19 Even when there are no delays in
the process, the actual means of stabilization implemented might differ
from the one originally designed due to the political process of
implementing policy. Accordingly, although ad hoc legislation might be
designed more accurately, the legislative process has intrinsic difficulties
casting doubt on its timely implementation.
Alongside discretionary fiscal stabilizers, there are also automatic
stabilizers which can be designed and implemented to reach stabilizing
results. Economists argue that automatic stabilizers are preferred
compared with discretionary ones—and, hence, frequently advocated
for—because they offer a quicker response to the business cycle.20 For
example, the tax system can be designed to respond automatically to
macroeconomic parameters serving as indicators of the business cycle.
Another example of an automatic stabilizer is transfer payments, such as
unemployment compensation, which grow as the levels of employment,
income, and product decline.21
Several types of taxes, such as income taxes and consumption taxes,
also have the ability to respond automatically to changes in the business
cycle. For example, the tax base narrows during a recession, because
incomes decrease. This, in turn, automatically lowers the tax burden and
serves as an anti-cyclical stabilizer. This means if the product level of an
economy decreases during a time of recession, income levels will also
Procedure:
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
NAT’L
BUREAU
ECON.
RSCH.,
http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions_faq.html; [https://perma.cc/Z52X-D8LS] (last visited Nov.
2, 2020); US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH.,
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html [https://perma.cc/776S-2NP5] (June 8, 2020).
18. John B. Taylor, The Lack of Empirical Rationale for a Revival of Discretionary Fiscal
Policy, 99 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 550, 550 (2009); LISTOKIN 2019, supra note 9, at 3,
9.
19. Listokin 2009, supra note 7, at 4–5; Listokin 2012, supra note 7, at 47 (finding these tax
policies may have the effect of pulling stimulus funds out of the economy); JOSEPH STIGLITZ,
ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR passim (3d ed., 2000); see John B. Taylor, Reassessing
Discretionary Fiscal Policy, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 27 (2000) (arguing that action may come from
political pressure and the need to be seen as acting amidst an economic downturn); see also Strnad,
supra note 3, at 173 (noting that a government may enact tax cuts or temporary tax increases in
government spending in order to stimulate demand); LISTOKIN 2019, supra note 9, at 6, 9.
20. Friedman, supra note 15, at 250 (advocating for the government to use automatic adaptions,
eliminating discretionary action, in order to offset fluctuations in the supply and demand of money);
Robert M. Solow, Rethinking Fiscal Policy, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 509, 509–14 (2005).
21. See Taylor, supra note 19, at 26 (noting the increase in spending on unemployment
compensation along with a decrease in tax revenue from declining employment).
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decrease. Concurrently, the average tax rates will go down, and the tax
burden will decrease in an anti-cyclical way.22 This response does not
require an identification of the stage of the business cycle or the
implementation of any explicit legislation.23
Even so, automatic responses are expected to be less accurate in
comparison to their discretionary counterparts. Automatic stabilizers do
not necessarily align with the business cycle in terms of timing, type, and
size of the required response.24 An adequate response to the business
cycle requires an accurate identification, or at least a good prediction, of
the business cycle. Identifying the phases of the business cycle is by no
means a trivial task. Economists use various economic indicators to
predict, identify, and characterize the stage of the business cycle. Not one
of these indicators, however, combined or on its own, is a perfect
predictor of the business cycle. As a result, we should expect automatic
fiscal stabilizers, which are designed based on one or a few
macroeconomic indicators, will not function as sufficient stabilizers. For
example, it is expected an automatic response of the income tax to a
decline in income levels will affect the business cycle. Yet, this effect is
not always timely or stabilizing in nature. Therefore, while a quicker
response to macroeconomic instability through an automatic fiscal
stabilizer may be more effective, it will ultimately be less accurate than
the potentially slower discretionary response.
Many empirical studies investigating the stabilizing effect of the tax
system on the economy have primarily focused on tax legislation and tax
reform. Despite the number of empirical studies, however, these studies
neglected to investigate the macroeconomic effect of judicial decisions
that ultimately implement these tax laws. Instead these empirical studies
focused on the effect of automatic fiscal stabilizers as compared to the
effect of discretionary fiscal stabilizers.
For example, Auerbach and Feenberg considered the effect of federal
taxes, specifically individual income and payroll taxes, as automatic
stabilizers of income fluctuations. The results of their study showed that
direct individual taxation can offset two to eight percent of the shock to
GDP. Their findings highlight the fact that despite the changes in the
American economy and American tax system throughout the years, there
has not been a significant change in the role of the tax system as an
automatic stabilizer over time. They also suggested that progressive
22. Strnad, supra note 3, at 173; MANKIW, supra note 2, at 287; Stiglitz, supra note 19.
23. See Listokin 2012, supra note 7, at 53, 56 (arguing that the stabilization effect of the larger
income tax rate and government spending rate having an automatic effect).
24. LISTOKIN 2019, supra note 9, at 160–62 (finding that some of the U.S. states and European
counties that have constitutional budget restrictions are limited in their ability to pursue fiscal
stabilization, especially during an economic downturn).
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taxation would have an automatic stabilizing effect through the work
supply.25
Taylor studied whether automatic stabilizers should be favored over
discretionary stabilizers. After reviewing empirical evidence on tax
benefits, the response of automatic stabilizers, and monetary policy in
times of zero interest rates, he concluded that countercyclical
discretionary fiscal policy should not be revitalized.26
Mabbett and Schelkle discussed whether the Lisbon Strategy, which
supports reform of tax-benefit systems, and the fiscal philosophy of the
EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that only automatic
stabilizers built into tax-benefit systems should be allowed to smooth
aggregate income, fit together. They found tax reform might interfere
with the stabilizing potential of tax-benefit systems.27
Dolls et al. compared the effectiveness of the European Union (EU)
and U.S. tax and transfer systems to provide income insurance through
automatic stabilization in the last financial crisis. They found automatic
stabilizers absorbed a larger portion of the income shock and the
employment shock in the EU than in the United States. Also, these anticyclical responses had a larger stabilizing effect on the aggregate demand
in the EU than in the United States, although the use of automatic
stabilizers in European countries is heterogenous. They also considered
whether countries with weak automatic stabilizers enact larger fiscal
stimulus programs but did not find supporting evidence.28
McKay and Reis measured the effect of tax and transfer programs on
stabilizing the business cycle. They found that transfer programs, which
are automatic stabilizers, had a stabilizing effect on economic output
levels, while lowering taxes or reducing taxes’ progressivity did not have
a stabilizing effect on the business cycle.29
Galle and Klick focused their research on the state level of taxation,
rather than on the federal level of taxation. States’ budgets are procyclical because during times of recession, tax revenue decreases and the

25. See Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic
Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 37 (2000) (arguing that in order to reduce changes in after-tax
income, a progressive income tax and a high marginal tax rate should be used).
26. See Taylor, supra note 18, at 551 (listing the tax rebates in 2001 and 2008 as clear
countercyclical discretionary policy periods).
27. Deborah Mabbett & Waltraud Schelkle, Bringing Macroeconomics Back to the Political
Economy of Reform: The Lisbon Agenda and the ‘Fiscal Philosophy’ of the EMU, 45 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 81, 86 (2007).
28. Mathias Dolls et al., Automatic Stabilizers and Economic Crisis: US vs. Europe, 96 J. PUB.
ECON. 279, 281 (2012).
29. Alisdair McKay & Ricardo Reis, The Role of Automatic Stabilizers in the U.S. Business
Cycle, 84 ECONOMETRICA 141, 141 (2016).
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recession worsens.30 But a state’s decision to raise taxes or borrow funds
to address budgetary concerns may result in negative migration or public
protest.31 Therefore, Galle and Klick argue that states need federal
assistance to address recessions because they cannot implement
stabilizing policy by themselves. Due to difficulties in anti-cyclical
implementation of federal programs, policymakers should utilize
automatic fiscal stabilizers, such as the state Alternative Minimum Tax
(AMT).32 The AMT liability increases as a taxpayer’s income increases.
While state income taxes may be deductible from the taxpayer’s federal
income tax liability and therefore act as a federal subsidy,33 the AMT
liability is not deductible. Thus, the AMT serves as an automatic fiscal
stabilizer. During recessions, fewer taxpayers are subjected to the AMT,
which in turn causes the federal tax subsidy to increase and subsequently
instigates public pressure to increase government expenditure. The AMT
can encourage the government to save during times of expansion and to
spend during times of recession.
In comparison with empirical studies on individual income taxes,
Buettner and Fuest studied how effective the corporate income tax is as
an automatic stabilizer. They found the corporate income tax offsets eight
percent of the effect of the economic shock on the corporate income. This
stabilizing effect is not constant throughout the business cycle and tends
to rise during recessions.34
To conclude this Part, I will note existing empirical studies on fiscal
stabilization focused on stabilizers designed by the legislature, whether
discretionary or automatic. This Article sheds light on another aspect of
the stabilizing effect of the tax system, as it focuses on the judiciary,
which has not yet received significant theoretical or empirical attention.

30. Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 191 (2010). For a
discussion on the pro-cyclicality of state budgeting, see Yilin Hou, Fiscal Reserves and State OwnSource Expenditure in Downturn Years, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 117, 123 (2005).
31. Galle & Klick, supra note 30, at 190.
32. For a description of the way the AMT operates, see Galle & Klick, supra note 30, at 191,
211–19. Galle & Klick focus on microeconomic, rather than macroeconomic, theory to analyze this
social insurance mechanism. See id. at 190, 192–95. The authors suggest designing a policy where
wealth is pushed from times of economic expansion to times of recession, as in the case of the
AMT, acts as an expanding policy and increases social welfare. Id.
33. See I.R.C. § 164 (setting forth an itemized deduction of certain types of taxes from a
taxpayer’s income). In 2017, Congress implemented a broad tax reform and enacted the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act (2017) which limits the state and local taxes deduction to $10,000 (the SALT cap).
34. Thiess Buettner & Clemens Fuest, The Role of the Corporate Income Tax as an Automatic
Stabilizer, 17 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 686, 686 (2010).
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II. THE EFFECT OF THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING IN TAX CASES
A. Theory
As stated previously, the tax system can be used as a fiscal stabilizer
in two primary ways: ad hoc legislation and automatic stabilizers. On the
one hand, ad hoc legislation can be designed more accurately, but the
entire process takes time. On the other hand, automatic stabilizers act
instantly but might be less accurate due to the lack of discretion and
oversight in their operation.
Accordingly, legal institutions, which include in this context both
judicial decisions in tax disputes and tax authorities’ determinations, are
an additional, quite interesting fiscal tool.35 This tool could be
characterized as a concrete fiscal decision made by a fiscal expert in a
dispute between a taxpayer and the government. Judicial decisions are
frequently reached faster than the legislature can enact new laws resulting
from the exercised discretion through the decisions of individual
policymakers.36 Further, judicial decisions are made with greater
frequency in comparison to the implementation of legislation and can
therefore provide a continuous stabilizing response to changes in the
business cycle.
It was surprising to find there are no theoretical or empirical studies on
the fiscal stabilizing potential of judicial decision-making. Such articles
would complement the theoretical and empirical discussion in the realms
of judicial decision-making and fiscal policy.
Several theoretical difficulties might stem from the claim regarding the
fiscal stabilizing potential of judicial decision-making. First, this
stabilizing tool and its stabilizing potential are solely dependent upon the
disputes brought to court and resolved at the tax authority’s level. Tax
litigation is not a dominant part of the economic activity in the judicial
realm. Frequently, those involved in tax disputes go to great lengths to
avoid litigation. Accordingly, one might argue this potential did not
receive much attention in the macroeconomic and judicial decisionmaking literature because the macroeconomic impact of judicial and
quasi-judicial decisions in tax cases might not be of significance.
However, court decisions in tax disputes—as in other areas—affect the
economic behaviors of unrelated parties. This institutional effect occurs

35. But see LISTOKIN 2019, supra note 9, at 19–20 (focusing on the use of legal policies).
36. Even though some time passes from the initiation of the dispute until it is resolved in court,
a stabilizing judicial decision is one which responds to the current stage of the business cycle and
not to the macroeconomic environment at the time of initiation.
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in the “shadow of trial.”37 Taxpayers and tax assessors internalize both
existing court decisions and anticipated ones. Therefore, the expected
impact of court decisions is broader and does not affect only the
immediate parties involved in the dispute.
Second, even if judges consider the business cycle in their rulings, they
are limited when these rulings have a binding power. If a judge decides a
case in a way that promotes stabilization, fiscal stabilization at the time
of the decision might be promoted; however if this decision becomes
precedent, it may become destabilizing in the future when the business
cycle has progressed to a different stage. For example, an expanding
fiscal decision—one that is in favor of the taxpayer—during a recession
is anti-cyclical and stabilizing but following the same decision in times
of expansion will have pro-cyclical and destabilizing effects. If judges
understand this potential consequence, they should not be guided by
macroeconomic considerations and only follow the law. Even so, this
study considers district courts, courts of first instance. Their rulings are
neither binding nor precedential, unlike appellate court rulings.38
In this study, I attempt to narrow the existing gap in the
macroeconomic literature regarding judicial fiscal responses and the
stabilizing potential of implementing stabilizing macroeconomic policy
in tax disputes. I do so by measuring the effect of the macroeconomic
environment on judicial decision-making in tax cases.39 The findings, in
37. This concept was originally discussed and developed in Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
In the criminal plea-bargaining context, see also Oren Bar‐Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains
Only for the Guilty, 49 J. L. & ECON. 353 (2006); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2466 (2004). Criminal procedure is a good comparison
because these are also cases where the government is a party. See Bibas, supra, at 2464 (offering
examples). Many subsequent articles have taken up this idea in the civil context. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 55, 56 (1982).
38. Even so, this difficulty is not fully resolved, since district court decisions might turn to
precedent if they are affirmed by the Supreme Court.
39. Two empirical studies researched the potential impact of judicial decisions and the business
cycle in other legal fields. Donohue & Siegelman studied the effect of the unemployment rates on
the volume of litigation in employment discrimination cases. They observed an anti-cyclical
response: judges awarded higher compensation amounts to employees subjected to discrimination
during recessions (which are correlated with longer unemployment periods). This high expected
value of filing suit during recessions results in more litigation. At the same time, more weak cases
are filed, which results in a lower win rate, in times of recession. See John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business
Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 711, 719 (1993); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The
Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to
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turn, can allow for and promote further theoretical and empirical
discussions of the stabilizing potential of the courts.
After laying the theoretical foundations and before introducing my
empirical study and findings, I briefly review two positive hypotheses
raised in other legal empirical literature regarding judges’ responses to
business cycles in tax cases. These hypotheses are not based on
macroeconomic theory and are different than the current study.
B. Empirical Research on Macroeconomics and Tax Decision-Making
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt conducted two empirical studies on the
effect of macroeconomic variables on judicial decision-making in the
U.S. Supreme Court during the 1920s and 1930s. They raised two
hypotheses. The first hypothesis was based on a cooperation theory of
judging. According to this hypothesis, during recessions judges will give
deference to the government by deciding in favor of it. Because judges
do not specialize in economics, they would support the government by
giving deference to it. This means that judges will support the
government’s economic policy by favoring the government more
frequently during times of crisis compared with ordinary times.40
The second hypothesis proposed by Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt was
based on an informational theory of crisis jurisprudence. According to
this hypothesis, judges prefer a growing economy than one that suffers
from recessions. Because judges could not apply fiscal policy to directly
affect the economy, they communicated their dissatisfaction of the
government’s economic policy through judicial decisions. Therefore,
during a “regular” recession—i.e., one not reaching the level of a
depression—judges will respond as voters and will decide in favor of the
taxpayer and not the government. They will do so to signal to the
government they do not approve of its flawed economic policy which
resulted in the recession. During economic upturns, judges will signal
their approval of the government’s economic policy by siding with the
government. The prediction would be different during extreme economic
circumstances that occur as a result of an exogenous shock and not
Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 428–30 (1995). Bachmeier, Gaughan &
Swanson reached similar findings in their research on the effect of macroeconomic indicators
(GDP, consumption levels, inflation rates, unemployment rates, and interest rates) on litigation in
antitrust, bankruptcy, contracts, body injuries and product liability. They analyzed the data using
different models, each time with a different explanatory macro variable. They found GDP,
consumption levels, and inflation rates had an anti-cyclical effect on litigation. When an economic
shock, connected to one of these variables, occurred, more cases were litigated in the abovementioned legal areas. Lance Bachmeier et al., The Volume of Federal Litigation and the
Macroeconomy, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 191, 193–94 (2004).
40. Thomas Brennan et al., The Political Economy of Judging, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1503, 1516–
17 (2009).
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because of the government malfunction (e.g., the Great Depression).
During extreme economic conditions, judges may be inclined to decide
in favor of the government as a way to assist in mitigation of the
economic crisis.41
This Article takes a different theoretical approach than these articles. I
propose focusing on tax judges’ potential as fiscal stabilizers. The first
step in the analysis of whether tax judges have the potential to act as fiscal
stabilizers is to consider whether their decisions follow a pattern that
corresponds with a macroeconomic theory.
III. METHODOLOGY
Next, I turn to the empirical analysis. First, I describe the research
design, the relevant variables, and the hypotheses. These hypotheses are
based on macroeconomic theory. The following parts of this study focus
primarily on the empirical results—descriptive statistics and the results
from the regression model—followed by their analysis.
A. The Legal Process
This study focuses on judicial decisions in income tax cases decided
by Israeli district court judges from 1993 to 2010. These disputes were
between taxpayers and the Israeli Tax Authority (tax authority). Tax
procedure in Israel is as follows. The Israeli Income Tax Ordinance
determines whether a taxpayer is required to file an annual tax report in
which they state their income for the preceding tax year. Other tax
information, such as income sources and filing status, is attached to this
report.42 A tax assessor can confirm or deny the taxpayer’s report. In
certain circumstances, the tax assessor will prepare a tax report on the tax
authority’s behalf.43 If the taxpayer does not agree with the assessor’s
41. Thomas Brennan et al., Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the
Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1195, 1212 (2009) [hereinafter Brennan et al., Economic Trends]. Two
other articles have already discussed Brennan et al., Economic Trends as part of a symposium on
judicial decision-making held at Duke University School of Law in 2009. See Scott Baker et al.,
Justices as Economic Fixers: A Response to A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1627
(2009); see Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Does the Supreme Court Follow the Economic
Returns? A Response to A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759 (2009). They have raised
several concerns regarding the authors’ argument and analysis. First, the theory that underlies the
judges-acting-as-voters decision-making mechanism is unclear. Second, they measured judges’
responses to the macroeconomic environment at the time of oral arguments and not at time of
decision. The final decision in the case, however, can take place long after oral arguments, which
means that judges’ responses might be missing the stabilization point. Finally, they do not consider
the normative implications of the behavioral pattern they identified, including on separation of
powers and judges’ actions being ultra vires.
42. See § 131, Israeli Income Tax Ordinance [New Version], LSI (1961). It should be noted this
section deals with self-employed taxpayers and not wage earners subject to a different tax-reporting
regime. For rules dictating wage earners, see id. § 164.
43. See id. § 145 (discussing the Power to assess and the assessment procedure).
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report, they can challenge it, at which point another assessor examines
the case.44 If the taxpayer disagrees with the second assessor’s decision,
they can turn, as a matter of right, to an Israeli district court, a court of
first instance in these types of disputes.45 The cases—referred to as “tax
appeals”—are heard by and decided by one judge, unless the Chief
District Court Judge orders otherwise.46 The taxpayer and the tax
authority can both appeal the district court’s decision, as a matter of right,
to the Israeli Supreme Court.47
Four characteristics of this legal process make this setting an ideal
scheme for quantitative empirical analysis. First, cases are decided by one
judge, similar to the procedures of the U.S. Tax Court, so controls to
mitigate the impact of panels are not necessary. Second, and similar to
U.S. Tax Court procedures, only the taxpayer can file the initial appeal to
the district court. This means the current dataset of district court decisions
has a practical and methodological advantage over other datasets that
include appeals filed by the tax authorities. Third, the nomination process
of judges in Israel is not as politically charged in comparison to the
judicial nomination process in the United States.48 Fourth, the economic
impact of the Great Recession on the Israeli economy was mild when
compared with the effect on the U.S. economy.49 This fact mitigates any
concerns about a significant shock that caused a structural shift in the
data.
44. See id. § 150–150a (illustrating the right of objection before the Assessing Officer).
45. See id. § 153 (discussing the Right of Appeal).
46. See id. § 154 (explaining the Court of Appeal).
47. See id. § 157 (describing the Appeal to Supreme Court).
48. Israeli judges are appointed by a committee consisting of nine members: three Supreme
Court judges, two lawyers representing the Israeli Bar Association, two parliament members, and
two ministers (including the Minister of Justice). This committee composition is meant to
neutralize, as much as possible, any political influence on the appointment process. The practical
empirical implication of such an appointment process is that it is difficult to specify a good proxy
for ideology or for political opinions of Israeli judges. But this is less significant in the Israeli
judiciary context.
49. See generally KOBI BRAUDE ET AL., BANK OF ISRAEL, ISRAEL AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS
2007–09
5–7
(September
2011),
https://www.boi.org.il/deptdata/mehkar/crisis/crisis_2007_2009_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/95AR-8YSR] (reporting Israel’s response to the global
economic crisis including the policies implemented and the impact on the Israeli financial system
and economy). See also Dylan Matthews, Stanley Fischer Saved Israel from the Great Recession.
Now Janet Yellen Wants Him to Help Save the U.S., WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2014, 8:58 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/13/stanley-fischer-saved-israel-fromthe-great-recession-now-janet-yellen-wants-him-to-help-save-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/U5LF6AK9] (“No Western country weathered the 2008–09 financial crisis better [than Israel]. For only
one quarter—the second of 2009—did the Israeli economy shrink, by a puny annual rate of 0.2
percent. That same period, the U.S. economy shrank by an annual rate of 4.6 percent. Many countries, including Britain and Germany, fared even worse. While they were languishing, by September
2009 Fischer [the leader of the Israeli central bank] was raising interest rates, all but declaring the
recession defeated.”).
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B. Data Collection
The sample consists of income tax cases—civil cases, called income
tax appeals—which I hand-collected and coded from the most
comprehensive Israeli electronic database of tax cases, “Misim
Online.”50 After retrieving a computed list of all income tax appeals
taxpayers filed to the district courts,51 I sampled every fifth case52 to
minimize selection bias.53Then I filtered cases that were decided by
generalist judges who do not specialize in tax cases. Nine judges decided
the 207 cases remaining in the sample (after screening out about 45 cases
that were decided by general judges).54
The study covers the period between the beginning of the second
quarter of 1993 and the end of the third quarter of 2010, which
corresponds with the period for which I have reliable business cycle data.
During these seventeen-and-a-half years, the Israeli economy had both
downturns and upturns: I identified four full business cycles and one-half
cycle.55 This provides an appealing empirical setting for a natural
experiment. In addition, the 2008 economic crisis did not have the
significant effect on the Israeli economy compared with other countries,
such as the United States. Therefore, there is no methodological need to
define different business cycles.56
I observed different variables in the sample, including case data and
judges’ personal and professional attributes.57 I collected and coded data
50. The database is called “Misim On-Line” and includes cases from 1987 to today.
51. The search proceeded as follows: for each year I chose the options: Court=“District Court”;
Legal Area=“Civil Cases”; Tax Area=“Income Tax”; search word=“Tax”.
52. In comparable studies, seven to fifteen percent of the cases were sampled.
53. Three appeals filed by partnerships were excluded from the list because of the low and
negligible frequency.
54. For an explanation on the identification of specialized tax judges, see Orli Oren-Kolbinger,
Measuring the Effect of Social Background on Judicial Decision-Making in Tax Cases, 22 FLA.
TAX REV. 579, 589–96 (2019) (discussing the personal and professional background parameters of
judges).
55. The recession period which started during the second quarter of 2008 reached a trough
during the first quarter of 2009. It was followed by an expansion period which started during the
second quarter of 2009, and the last observation of it was made by Djivre & Yakhin (2011) during
the second quarter of 2010. See Yosi Djivre & Yossi Yakhin, Business Cycles in Israel, 1987–
2010: The Facts, 13 (The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, the Hebrew
University, Working Paper No. 11.02, 2011).
56. Contra Brennan et al., Economic Trends, supra note 41. Also, the global economic crisis
which started in 2007 affected many economies. But the Israeli market was less affected than other
economies hit by the economic crisis. The Israeli economy was relatively resilient, and different
economic indices have improved during 2008–2012 from their values in 2007, compared with other
countries. See DANIEL ROSENMAN, BANK OF ISRAEL REPORT: INDICATOR CHANGES IN THE
ISRAELI ECONOMY IN COMPARISON WITH OECD COUNTRIES 2 (August 2014),
http://www.boi.org.il/he/Research/DocLib1/PP1405h.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VQG-HT9H].
57. The Israeli Judicial Authority—Israeli Judges, GOV.IL, https://judgescv.court.gov.il/ (last
visited Dec. 17, 2020) (search engine, information about current and former judges, in Hebrew).
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such as the prevailing party, taxpayer type, taxpayer legal representation,
length of decisions (as measured by word count), year the case started,
date of decision, and length of proceedings. I also collected and coded
information about the judges who decided the cases, including the judge’s
name, age at the time of appointment, gender, seniority at the time of the
decision, age at the time of the decision, previous professional
occupation, specialization in tax (if any), law school, place of birth, and
religious tendencies. In addition, I gathered data on the main independent
variable: the business cycle. I coded the business cycle data in several
ways that track the possible ways in which judges identify the changes in
the cycle.
Income tax cases provide an excellent case study for investigating the
hypotheses presented in this Article about the effect of the
macroeconomic environment on judicial decision-making.58 First, the
government is always a party in the dispute. Second, it is known to all—
not only to tax scholars and economists—that tax laws affect growth rates
and economic stability. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume judges
understand their decisions in tax disputes have fiscal consequences.59
C. The Regression Variables
The dependent variable is the case outcomes, or more specifically, the
judge’s level of acceptance of the taxpayer’s claim. The main explanatory
variable in the regression model is the business cycle, and I discuss
several alternative ways of coding it.60 The model also includes the
following control variables: judges’ gender, previous occupation,
seniority, the taxpayer’s type, and court’s district.61
1. The Dependent Variable: The Judge’s Level of Acceptance of the
Taxpayer’s Claim
The dependent variable is an ordinal variable measured by the judge’s
level of acceptance of the taxpayer’s claim. I divided this variable into
three categories that are ordered in a way that has legal meaning: (1)
taxpayer claims the court fully accepted, (2) taxpayer claims the court
partly accepted, and (3) taxpayer claims the court fully rejected.
This coding manner better reflects the legal reality of nonbinary
58. See Brennan et al., Economic Trends, supra note 41, at 1209 (explaining why and how
taxation is a good way to investigate the effects of the economy on judicial behavior).
59. FARROKH K. LANGDANA, MACROECONOMIC POLICY: DEMYSTIFYING MONETARY AND
FISCAL POLICY 10 (2002) (“Adherents of this model, the supply-siders, have claimed responsibility
for the US macroeconomic performance of the 1980s through the early 2000s.”).
60. Meaning during which phase in the cycle the case was decided, e.g., during a recession or
expansion.
61. Race and nationality of judges were not included in the model because all the judges in the
dataset share the same race and nationality.
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outcomes. This distinguishes my Article from most of the earlier
empirical literature assessing the prevailing party. It allows for an
intermediate category standing for cases where the court accepted at least
one of the taxpayer’s claims. Another way of describing this intermediate
category is a place for cases where the court did not decide the outcome
in a binary way. Further, this coding manner considers the ordinal feature
of potential legal outcomes, while binary division does not. The
distribution of case outcomes demonstrates about 40% of cases were not
decided completely in favor of either the taxpayer or the government.
This emphasizes the importance of including at least one intermediate
category when analyzing the prevailing party so relevant empirical
information is not lost.
2. The Independent Variable: Business Cycles
a. Measuring the Business Cycle
The economic literature shows measuring the business cycle is no easy
task. Different schools of economic thought advocate for different
methods of measurement.62 For example, economists usually declare a
recession after two consecutive quarters of downward GDP levels.63 But
during the recessionary period of 2001 in the United States, the two
quarters with negative GDP rates were not consecutive.64 Conversely, the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) explicitly declares its
determination of the various stages of the business cycle is not subject to
a rigid rule of demarcation.65 In its work, the NBER considers the
changes in various macroeconomic variables besides the GDP levels,
including the real GDP, unemployment rate, and real wages.66
62. Victor Zarnowitz, What Is a Business Cycle, in THE BUSINESS CYCLE: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE 3, 3 (Michael T. Belongia & Michelle R. Garfinkel, eds., 1992).
63. See The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Procedure: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L
BUREAU ECON. RSCH. (July 28, 2020), https://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions_faq.html
[https://perma.cc/7WZU-BCPG] (discussing how the financial press states the definition of a
recession).
64. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 258–59 (reiterating in 2001 the two quarters with negative
GDP rates were not consecutive).
65. See The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Procedure: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note
63 (discussing what indicators the committee uses to determine peak and trough dates).
66. See US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH. (June
8, 2020), http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html [https://perma.cc/7JMG-H2RA] (showing
contractions start at the peak of a business cycle and end at the trough); see also Business Cycle
Dating,
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH.,
http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html
[https://perma.cc/5CBG-PF37] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (explaining how the National Bureau
maintains a chronology of U.S. business cycles). In comparison, the Real Business Cycle
economists focused on technological shocks as affecting the GDP levels for business cycle
estimation, whereas Keynesian economists focused on changes in the aggregate demand as causing
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The research on business cycles in Israel has expanded since 2002.67
For this study, I used the data and analysis from Djivre and Yakhin of the
Bank of Israel.68 In their study, they documented the business cycles in
Israel between 1987 and 2010, starting a year-and-a-half after the
implementation of the “1985 Stabilization Plan,” and using fifty-one
time-series of various macroeconomic variables.69 They measured the
variance in the variables compared to the GDP of Israel during this time
and how much the variables were correlated with the GDP, given
different time lags. This study also measured the business cycle as a
diversion of each series from its trend using several filters offered in
earlier economic literature.70 They identified the peaks and troughs in the
business cycles after calculating the data on five main macroeconomic
variables: the GDP, the level of investment in fixed assets, the levels of
consumption of durable goods, the number of employed persons, and the
number of hours each employee worked.71
The main difference between the identification method used by Djivre
and Yakhin compared with the method in previous studies is that Djivre
and Yakhin identified the 1990s, a period associated with a significant
wave of immigration in Israel, as a period of two business cycles rather
than an extended period of expansion. Djivre and Yakhin identified a
the fluctuations in GDP levels. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Time to Build and
Aggregate Fluctuations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1345, 1365–66 (1982); see also Edward C. Prescott,
Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement, in REAL BUSINESS CYCLES 83 (James E. Harley et
al. eds., 1998); John B. Long Jr. & Charles I. Plosser, Real Business Cycles, 91 J. POL. ECON 39,
43 (1983). But Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992) claimed that considering the effect of
technological shocks is not enough, because government expenditure also affects the employment
supply. See generally Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum, Current Real Business Cycle
Theories and Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 430 (1992).
67. Rafi Melnick & Yehudit Golan, Measurement of Business Fluctuations in Israel, 67 BANK
OF ISRAEL, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 91.01, 3 (Jan. 1991); Rafi Melnick, Business Cycles in Israel,
49 THE ECONOMIC QUARTERLY 219, 219 (2002) (in Hebrew); Arie Marom et al., The State-of-theEconomy Index and the Probability of Recession: the Markov Regime-Switching Model, BANK OF
ISRAEL,
DISCUSSION
PAPER
NO.
2003.05,
(June
2003),
https://www.boi.org.il/deptdata/mehkar/papers/dp0305e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XA5A-HCZG]
(discussing how business cycles are measured in Israel and worldwide); Michel Strawczynski &
Karnit Flug, Persistent Growth Episodes and Macroeconomic Policy Performance in Israel, BANK
OF ISRAEL SURVEY, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2007.08 (July 2007); Polina Dovman, Recessions in
Israel and Macroeconomic and Financial Crises—Their Duration and Severity, BANK OF ISRAEL,
DISCUSSION
PAPER
SERIES
NO.
2010.08,
(Aug.
2010),
http://www.boi.org.il/deptdata/mehkar/papers/dp1008h.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4VK-KU7Q] (in
Hebrew); Djivre & Yakhin, supra note 55, at 8 (explaining how business cycles of Israeli economy
are measured).
68. See Djivre & Yakhin, supra note 55, at 8–32 (highlighting the data and analysis used in the
study).
69. See id. at 1. Among the variables they covered are variables of the national accounts, labor,
money and capital markets, and exchange rates.
70. See id. at 12 (explaining the use of principle component methodology).
71. See id. at 11–12 (highlighting the principle components analysis).
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trough in the second quarter of 1993 after using actual information on
GDP and additional macroeconomic variables instead of proxies to
economic activity used in previous studies.72
b. Coding the Business Cycle
In this Article, I suggest four separate options for coding the
independent variable—the business cycle—to estimate its effect on
judicial decision-making in Israeli tax cases. Here, I describe them and
posit two of the four options are more appropriate for operationalizing
the dependent variable for the regression analysis.
i. Four Categories, in Line with the Traditional Stages in the
Business Cycle
As explained above, each business cycle is comprised of four
consecutive stages. To code it, I can refer to it as an ordinal variable with
four categories: recession coded as one (1); trough coded as two (2);
expansion coded as three (3); and peak coded as four (4). The recession
period reflects the time between the peak and the following trough,
whereas the expansion period reflects the time between the trough and
the following peak.
ii. Transforming the Four Categories from Subsection i to Two
Categories
This empirical study sets forth a series of natural experiments, in which
a treatment group is compared with a control group to investigate how
exposure to the treatment affects the outcome. In this study, the business
cycle can be treated as a variable describing the relative macroeconomic
state of the market, meaning whether the market is generally contracting
or expanding.73 The four categories can thus be transformed into a
dummy variable, which has two categories: the market is contracting
(recession and trough) being 0; and the market is expanding (expansion
and peak) being 1.
But these first two options of coding are based on retrospective
identification of the stage in the business cycle. Economic institutions,
such as the NBER, identify the stages in the business cycle after sufficient
information has accumulated, which takes time. Because this study
focuses on judges’ responses to the macroeconomic environment at the
time of the decision, and not in retrospect, the business cycle variable
should reflect this. The theoretical assumption is judges can identify the
macroeconomic trend and respond to it. But it is safe to assume judges
72. See Djivre & Yakhin, supra note 55, at 14 n.13–14 (describing an example of a proxy).
73. See Brennan et al., supra note 41, at 1213 (explaining how cycles were incorporated into
the statistic model).
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can find it difficult to identify exactly when transitions happen, whether
from recession to trough and then upward, and from expansion to peak
and then downward. I suggest the following two coding options of the
business cycle that focus on the way judges identify the stage in the cycle,
rather than when judges identify the stage in the cycle.
iii. Four Categories, Which Describe the Stages in the Business
Cycle as They Are Identified by Judges During the Business Cycle and
Not in Retrospect
Judges might experience difficulties when they need to accurately
identify the transition between the various stages of the business cycle.
Even so, they can estimate when there is an upturn or a downturn, and
when the market is around a peak or a trough.
Figure 1: Business Cycle Stages as Identified by Judges74

This coding option assumes that when the market begins to move away
from the peak area (labeled as 4), it will take some time until judges
realize the market is no longer at the peak and economic conditions are
instead worsening. At a certain point, judges realize that the market
transitions to the early recession stage, which differs from the peak. Now
the economic downturn is noticeable, and judges identify a late recession
stage. This represents a clear identification that the market is getting
closer to a trough. At a certain point, which is not the actual trough, judges
will assume things cannot worsen and the market has reached a trough.
Only after the market is clearly showing signs of recovery will judges
notice the market is no longer at a trough. When they do notice the
change, the market will be in an early expansion, which judges perceive
as similar to the late recession, because the economic hardship before and
after the trough is still significant. Later, the market transitions to a late
74. For this figure, I modified figure 5 in Gary Gorton & K. Geert Rouwenhorst,
Facts and Fantasies About Commodity Futures, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 47, 56 fig.5
(2006), and adapted it to the analysis offered in this Article.
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expansion, which is similar to the early recession, because the market is
getting better, even if it did not yet reach the peak.
To match the cases in the sample with the corresponding stage in the
business cycle, I divided each half-cycle period, between a peak and a
trough, and then between a trough and a peak, to four equal parts, as
shown in Figure 1, above. I coded each of the four parts according to the
economic intuition I described. According to this coding option, the
variable is a nominal-categorical one, and not ordinal.
In addition, we can expect judges to identify these stages by observing
some economic indicators, such as the unemployment rate or the interest
rate. Because the reports on such indicators—whether official or in the
media—are somewhat delayed, each stage in the cycle will be identified
by the judges as soon as reports are made available. Therefore, I allowed
for four different shifts in the business cycle coding, ranging from one to
four quarters, and matched the court cases accordingly.75
iv. Transforming the Four Categories from Subsection iii to Two
Categories
Following the rationale of defining Subsection ii, I transformed the
four categories from Subsection iii to a binary dummy variable as well. I
combined categories 1 and 2, as defined in Subsection iii, which represent
an economic contraction (now labeled as 0) and categories 3 and 4, as
defined in Subsection iii, which represent an economic expansion (now
labeled as 1).
I will note that the business cycle variable was found to be statistically
significant when coding options (3) and (4) of the business cycle, and
when allowing for a one-quarter shift in the data.76
In addition, because the business cycle is an index of several
macroeconomic variables, one cannot include those variables in the
regression alongside the business cycle variable. Doing so will lead to
multicollinearity.77

75. For example, a one-quarter shift means that decisions that were made during quarter #1 will
be matched to the stage in the business cycle during quarter #2.
76. A two-quarter shift, or more, leads to a decrease in the significance of the business cycle
variable. In Part V I explain why I reject these models.
77. An alternative analysis may substitute the business cycle variable with a deficit to GDP ratio
variable and the unemployment rate variable.
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c. Control Variables
Based on the theoretical literature on judicial decision-making, the
following explanatory variables were included in the analysis as control
variables:
1. Gender of judge: a dummy variable, coded as either “male” or
“female.”
2. Previous occupation: a categorical variable, coded as (1) former
private practice experience with no (or little) public sector experience, (2)
combined private practice and public sector experience, or (3) former
public sector experience with no (or little) private practice experience.
3. Seniority: a continuous variable, measured as the number of months
a judge served in the position when she or he decided the case.
4. Taxpayer type: a categorical variable, coded as (1) individual
taxpayer, (2) business entity, or (3) combined individual and business
entity.
5. The district where the court sits: a categorical variable, coded as (1)
Jerusalem, (2) Tel-Aviv, (3) Haifa, (4) North, or (5) South.
D. Hypotheses
Two normative economic hypotheses can be derived from the
macroeconomic theories discussed earlier about the way the business
cycle affects judicial decision-making in tax cases. Because these
hypotheses are grounded in economic theory, it is assumed judges are
aware of these theories and they understand, to some extent, that their
decisions have fiscal consequences. But I cannot estimate which
macroeconomic theory judges’ behavior follows. Therefore, I offer two
alternative hypotheses following the two main groups of macroeconomic
theories on the business cycle:
(1) According to monetary or “real business cycle” theories, there will
be no need for fiscal intervention to stabilize the economy. Therefore, the
state of the macroeconomic environment will not affect judicial decisionmaking in tax cases and judges’ decisions will be noncyclical and
independent of the business cycle.
(2) According to the Keynesian theory, judges will reach stabilizing
decisions when deciding tax cases. Therefore, the specific stage in the
business cycle will affect their decisions in an anti-cyclical and stabilizing
way. This means judges will favor the tax authorities in times of
expansion and will favor the taxpayers in times of recession.
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IV. RESULTS
Here, I describe the data, using descriptive statistics, followed by the
results from the regression analysis. As part of the estimation process, I
estimated four regression models corresponding with the four coding
options of the business cycle. To do so, I ran each of the four models four
times, accounting for the four shifting options, totaling sixteen regression
models. The purpose was to identify the model better explaining the
effect of the business cycle on judicial decision-making in tax cases. This
model was the one in which the business cycle was coded as described in
Subsection iii78 and allowed for a one-quarter shift in the data, meaning
it takes the judges one quarter to identify the change.
A one-quarter shift also means a shift in the start and end of the period
this study covers. Therefore, although matching the timing of the decision
in the original sample with the business cycle data means covering the
first quarter of 1993 until the end of the second quarter of 2010, the actual
cases which were the basis of the analysis were decided between the
second quarter of 1993 and the third quarter of 2010. Nonetheless, the
research covers a period of seventeen-and-a-half years.
This Part of the Article focuses on the one specific model mentioned
above. But in the discussion, I compare it to the parallel model where the
business cycle was coded according to Subsection iv79 and allowed for a
one-quarter shift in the data.
A. Descriptive Statistics
The sample in this study includes 207 decisions in tax disputes decided
by nine judges who are considered specialized tax judges in Israeli district
courts. The cases were decided from the beginning of the second quarter
of 1993 through the end of the third quarter of 2010, as explained above.
The main findings are the following:
Table 1: Distribution of Taxpayers’ Appeals by
Levels of Acceptance (N=207)

Court’s Acceptance Level
of the Taxpayer’s Appeal
The taxpayer’s appeal was fully accepted = 0
The taxpayer’s appeal was partly accepted = 1
The taxpayer’s appeal was fully rejected = 2

78. See supra Section III.C.2.b.iii.
79. Supra Section III.C.2.b.iv.

No. of
Cases
35
83
89

% of
Cases
16.92%
40.14%
42.94%
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Table 1 shows that only 16.92% of appeals, which are filed only by
taxpayers, were fully accepted and 42.94% of appeals were fully rejected.
The remaining 40.14% of appeals were partly accepted, meaning that at
least one of the taxpayer’s claims in these cases was accepted.
Table 2: Distribution of Taxpayers’ Appeals by Levels
of Acceptance and by the Business Cycle Category (N=207)

Appeal
fully
accepted
=0

Updated
Recession
(=1)
No. of
Cases
(% of
Cases in
Sample)
9
(4.35%)

The Stage in the Business Cycle
Updated
Updated
Updated
Trough
Expansion
Peak
(=2)
(=3)
(=4)
No. of
No. of
No. of
Cases
Cases
Cases
(% of
(% of Cases (% of
Cases in
in Sample)
Cases in
Sample)
Sample)
11
5
10
(5.32%)
(2.42%)
(16.92%)

Total No.
of Cases
(% of
Cases in
Sample)

35
(16.92%)

Appeal
partly
accepted
=1

17
(8.21%)

16
(7.73%)

25
(12.1%)

25
(12.1%)

83
(40.14%)

Appeal
fully
rejected
=2
Total

35
(16.91%)

26
(12.55%)

16
(7.73%)

12
(5.75%)

89
(42.94%)

61
(29.47%)

53
(25.6%)

46
(22.25%)

47
(22.68%)

207
(100%)

Table 2 shows that almost 30% of cases were decided during the
updated recession period, followed by the updated trough period, with
almost 26% of cases. About 22.5% of cases were decided during each of
the updated expansion and peak stages. This means that about 55% of
cases were decided during periods when the economy was perceived as
being relatively in “bad” shape, whereas about 45% of cases were decided
during periods when the economy was perceived as being relatively in
“good” shape. Moreover, during times of recession and trough, more
appeals were rejected, whereas during times of expansion and peak, more
appeals were partly or fully accepted.
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B. Econometric Analysis: Ordinal Regression
1. General
In this Article, I analyze the effect of the business cycle in Israel on the
judge’s level of acceptance of the taxpayer’s claim, using an ordinal
regression model. I am using this model because the dependent
variable—the case outcome—has three categories ordered in a legally
meaningful order.
In their studies on the effect of the business cycle on U.S. Supreme
Court decision-making in tax cases, Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt coded
the dependent variable of the case outcome as binary.80 Accordingly, they
mostly used a logistic regression model for estimation purposes. This
means they had to take the range of outcomes and categorize it in a binary
way.81 But doing so may result in a loss of meaningful legal data.82
The value of allowing a middle category when coding the dependent
variable is clear, because in about 40% of cases the judge decided to
partly accept the taxpayer’s appeal.

80. See Brennan et al., Political Economy, supra note 40, at 1520–21 (describing the statistical
models and predictions); Brennan et al., Economic Trends, supra note 41, at 1211 (explaining the
ways the primary dependent variable was coded).
81. See Brennan et al., Political Economy, supra note 40, at 1520–21 (describing the process
for examining variables); Brennan et al., Economic Trends, supra note 41, at 1220. In their second
empirical study, Economic Trends, the authors coded the case outcomes dependent variable once
as binary and then as continuous. This allowed them to estimate the effect of the business cycle on
case outcomes using logistic regression but also using linear regression. For using linear regression,
they defined the dependent variable as the number of justices—of the nine Supreme Court
Justices—who decided in favor of the taxpayer. But the number of justices is finite rather than
continuous and has a top and bottom limit. Therefore, a linear regression is not the best
methodology in this circumstance. The authors mentioned they were aware of this difficulty but
wished to present a general trend compared with the results received from the logistic regression.
See Brennan et al., Economic Trends, supra note 41, at 1220.
82. See Oren-Kolbinger, supra note 55 (explaining how a binary set of outcomes may result in
the loss of data).
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2. Regression Model Results
Table 3: Ordinal Regression Model: Results
Independent Coefficient
Variable
(Std. Div.)
The Business 1.157***
Cycle
1.046**
0.457
Previous
Occupation

Gender

Odds Ratio83
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

1.024*

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒

2.117**

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 & 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐

−1.029**

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒

Sig.

= 3.18
= 2.85
= 1.58
= 2.78
= 3.92
= 0.36

0.006

0.013
0.281
0.066
0.052
0.039

Seniority

Nonsignificant

District
Taxpayer
Type

Nonsignificant
Nonsignificant

Link Function: Cauchit; N=207; Chi-Square=33.07*** ; df=10;
Pseudo R-square=16.9%; Model Predictability=55.1%;
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

The main independent variable in the analysis is the business cycle,
which was coded in a way that tracks how judges perceive it.
The chi-squared test estimates the significance of the regression model
itself, meaning whether the combination of the independent variables
affects the dependent variable of the case outcome. The chi-squared value
calculated for the model is 33.07 and is statistically significant (p=0.000).
This means the likelihood that this combination of independent variables
explains the dependent variable only by random happenstance is
practically zero. The model predictability is 55.1%. The pseudo Rsquared is 0.169, although the independent variable of the business cycle

83. The odds of one category of an independent variable over the odds of another category to
choose higher categories of the dependent variable.
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and most of the control variables are statistically significant. Although
the R-squared value is not high, this means there are other potential
variables not included in the analysis which might be affecting the case
outcomes. As I explain below, this outcome is still meaningful. This is
because the claim was not that judges solely follow macroeconomic
considerations, but rather these considerations direct judges’ decisions
alongside the rule of law.
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION
Here, I analyze the results described above and whether the hypotheses
can be rejected or affirmed. This way I can assess the positive and, to
some extent, the normative implications of the results, as well as the
contribution of this study to the existing literature.
The alternate hypotheses were the “independent” hypothesis, where
the macroeconomic environment does not affect judicial decisionmaking, and the “stabilizing” hypothesis, where judges will favor tax
authorities in times of expansion and taxpayers in times of recession.
Interpreting the odds ratio shows the business cycle has a statistically
significant effect on the level of acceptance of the taxpayer’s claim. More
specifically, the tendency to favor the tax authorities is higher during
recessions, as compared to the tendency to favor taxpayers during
expansions. In times of recessions, judges were inclined to choose a
higher category of the dependent variable, meaning they rejected more
taxpayers’ claims (odds ratio=3.18, p<0.01). During troughs, judges were
inclined to choose a higher category of the dependent variable as well,
meaning again that they rejected a larger portion of the taxpayers’ appeals
(odds ratio=2.85, p<0.05). When comparing the odds of deciding in favor
of the tax authority during peaks and expansions, the difference was not
statistically significant.84 The observed effect between recessions and
troughs regarding favoring the tax authority is very similar, and even
slightly stronger during recessions.85
Nonetheless, this tendency follows a pro-cyclical trend. This means
judicial decisions are more favorable to the tax authority during times of
economic downturns and are more favorable to the taxpayers during
economic upturns. This is, by definition, an anti-stabilizing fiscal policy.
The alternative regression model, where the business cycle was coded
in the binary way of option iv,86 produced the same results. This can serve
as a robustness check. As described above, I combined the recession and
84. The reference category in the regression is the “peak” stage. I also ran the regression with
the other three stages as reference categories, and the results follow the same trend.
85. Although one would expect the effect to be the strongest during troughs.
86. See supra Section III.C.2.b.iv.
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trough into one category and expansion and peak into a second category.
When the business cycle is defined this way, there is a statistically
significant difference between judges’ responses when the economy is
generally considered to be good and when the economy is generally
considered to be bad. The interpretation of the odds ratio is that judges
are more inclined to choose a higher category of the dependent variable—
they favor the tax authority—when the state of the economy is considered
bad as compared to when the state of the economy is considered good.
This also means judges are more inclined to decide in favor of the
taxpayer when times are generally considered good. The dual-phase
description of the business cycle and the regression results support the
more specific results received by using a four-phase business cycle in the
regression model.
These positive findings are not in line with any of the two theoretical
predictions following macroeconomic theory. The empirical findings are
surprising when considering the Keynesian theory (prescribing a
countercyclical response) and the other theories (prescribing no
response). But the results reveal a pro-cyclical response by judges
deciding tax cases, which leads to anti-stabilizing outcomes. This means
that courts are failing to realize their stabilizing potential as fiscal
stabilizers while actually responding in a way that undermines economic
stability. As I propose in this Article, courts can respond—at least
potentially—to the business cycle faster than the legislature, while
exercising discretion and reaching a more fine-tuned macroeconomic
outcome. But it appears the direction of the response is not the one
predicted by economic theory.
Although the empirical findings cannot be explained normatively by
macroeconomic theory, other positive explanations can be offered to
explain this pattern of judicial decision-making. For example, consider
the macroeconomic policy designed by Israeli policymakers during times
of market instability. This piece of information will complement the
interpretation of the empirical findings.
Data from different economies shows developed economies apply anticyclical stabilizing fiscal policy whereas developing economies use procyclical fiscal policy.87 When it comes to the fiscal policy applied by
Israeli policymakers, it has been shown to be pro-cyclical over time,
although the Israeli economy is categorized as a developed one and one
that uses automatic stabilizers.88 This means Israeli policymakers apply
contractionary fiscal policy—mainly, lowering government spending—
87. Michel Strawczynski & Joseph Zeira, Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy in Israel, 5 ISRAEL ECON.
REV. 47, 50 (2007).
88. See supra note 67.
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during economic downturns, although this policy can worsen an
economic crisis.
Economists have labeled the findings of the Israeli government’s
expenditure policy as pro-cyclical.89 Strawczynski and Zeira found
government spending is pro-cyclical, but not to the extent found in earlier
studies.90 Specifically, they showed that over time, especially since the
implementation of the Economic Stabilization Program of 1985,91 the
expenditure policy has become relatively more countercyclical.92 But
Israeli fiscal policy is still pro-cyclical, despite this identified
improvement. Strawczynski and Zeira suggest that the Israeli economy
suffered a trauma because of uncontrollable fiscal policy between 1973
and 1985.93 This policy led to elevated levels of government expenditure
and subsequent deficit, which resulted in a high public debt.94 The
government has been trying to reduce this debt for many years.95
These facts can help explain why the government is using recessions,
during which tax collection is lower, to reduce expenditures and debt. But
this means implementing pro-cyclical policy. Strawczynski and Zeira
conclude their article by wondering when the effects of the economic
trauma will fade away. They claim minimizing the levels of procyclicality is the first step for the Israeli economy to move toward the
implementation of a countercyclical fiscal policy, as is expected from a
developed country.96 Therefore, it is safe to say during the time frame
this Article covers, Israeli fiscal policy was pro-cyclical.
A similar hypothesis can be made with respect to the Israeli judges
sitting for tax cases. These judges were exposed to the economic trauma
and internalized it, which can explain their pro-cyclical response to the
business cycle when they decide tax disputes. This hypothesis holds even
more if we focus on the six out of nine specialized tax judges who started
their judicial careers in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, six out of the
nine specialized tax judges gained previous professional experience in the
public sector prior to their judicial nomination, which could increase their
exposure to the government’s policy when addressing economic issues.
I will note again the third and fourth regression models, which use the
89. Strawczynski & Zeira, supra note 87, at 55.
90. Id.
91. See generally Stanley Fischer, The Israeli Stabilization Program, 1985–86, 77 AM. ECON.
REV. 275, 275–78 (1987) (offering an assessment of the program the Israeli government
implemented to stabilize hyper-inflation while avoiding an increase in unemployment rate);
Strawczynski & Zeira, supra note 87, at 53.
92. Strawczynski & Zeira, supra note 87, at 56, 62.
93. Id. at 53.
94. Id. at 59–60.
95. Id. at 64–65.
96. Id. at 65.
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four-phase coding and the binary coding of the business cycle, allow for
a one-quarter shifting of the judges-business-cycle data points. As
discussed above, we should expect a time lag between the actual stage of
the business cycle and its identification by the public, and subsequently
the judges.97
CONCLUSION
It is socially and academically important to empirically analyze
judges’ decisions. The positive findings have normative implications;
they provide policymakers with information. Furthermore, these findings
can assist in the design of legal rules and institutions that produce more
socially desirable outcomes. This empirical study contributes to the
existing, although limited, body of knowledge about the relationship
between the macroeconomic environment and judicial decision-making,
especially in the taxation context. This study is the first to suggest using
macroeconomic theory in making normative-economic predictions
concerning the potential effect of the business cycle on judicial decisionmaking in tax cases. It is also the first study to empirically test these
predictions.
The fiscal consequences of judges’ decisions in tax cases are clear.
When judges decide in favor of taxpayers, the taxpayer can consume
more, and the aggregate demand may increase as a result. If the tax court
decides in favor of the government, taxpayers are in turn able to consume
less, and the aggregate demand may decrease as a result. As changes in
the aggregate demand define the business cycle, it is important to have a
comprehensive understanding of the various factors that affect the
aggregate demand.
I offered several ways to methodologically model how judges identify
the stage of the business cycle and its changes. I offered an alternative
way to describe how judges identify the stage in the business cycle. I
found it methodologically preferable to use it over the traditional
identification method, which identifies the stages of the business cycle
only retroactively. Further, I coded the dependent variable—the case
outcome—as an ordinal variable, rather than a binary one, to capture
more information about the prevailing party. This method of coding
97. As mentioned in Section IV.B., I ran the regressions for models three and four, allowing
also for a two-, three-, and four-quarter shifting of the judges-business-cycle data points. This
means I shifted the beginning and ending of the time period this study covers, accordingly. Of
course, in all cases it was seventeen-and-a-half years. I did so to identify the model best describing
the relationship between the main explanatory variable of the business cycle and the dependent
variable of the case outcome. The best fit was the model in which the business cycle variable was
defined according to the third option. In this model, the judges identify the changes in the economic
environment as they occur, and not retroactively as economic experts; and it takes them three
months—a quarter of the year—to identify the current stage.
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better reflects legal reality, especially when a sizeable portion of the cases
are not decided in a binary way.
The literature on law and macroeconomics is limited, especially in the
context of judicial decision-making. This study introduced normative
hypotheses relying on macroeconomic theory. According to these
hypotheses, judges will use anti-cyclical fiscal policy for stabilizing
purposes or will not respond at all. The main finding derived from the
econometric model was rather surprising: there was positive support to
the claim that judges decide tax cases in a pro-cyclical way. The
explanation I suggested for this positive finding is judges implement the
Israeli government’s policy to respond to pro-cyclical economic
fluctuations. Judges do so because this is the macroeconomic policy with
which they are familiar.
Although the business cycle variable coefficient, other control
variables, and the high prediction rate of the model were statistically
significant, the explained variance rate was not very high. This means
there is a possibility that other variables the model does not cover may
affect the level of acceptance of the taxpayer’s claim. Specifically, the
classic and basic normative model of judicial decision-making—legal
reasoning—cannot be rejected.
This study was positive, rather than normative. Even so, the positive
findings can provide decision-makers with data and guidance on how to
design laws and institutions, especially as to whether the macroeconomic
environment is present in courts. The empirical findings suggest judges
do respond to the business cycle. Judges use discretion when they decide
legal disputes. Their decisions have the opportunity to provide a faster
response to the stage in the business cycle, especially when compared to
the implementation of legislation. Therefore, judges’ decisions can act as
fiscal stabilizers. However, at least in the Israeli setting, their stabilizing
potential is not fully realized, for judges frequently make pro-cyclical and
destabilizing decisions.
I plan to expand this research in two main directions: empirical and
normative. First, I will replicate the current research design and test the
hypotheses I developed in this study using additional datasets, mainly of
cases that were decided in the U.S. Tax Court. Doing so will offer both a
U.S. domestic point of view and an opportunity to compare judicial
behavior in jurisdictions that vary in their economies and legal traditions.
Second, I will discuss the normative implications of the empirical
findings. Given the stabilizing potential of the judiciary, I will analyze
whether judges should consider the macroeconomic environment, and if
so, how should we design this stabilizing mechanism. I will focus on
issues, such as the impact on separation of powers, requiring judges to be
economically proficient, and requiring the judiciary to be coordinated
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with the other branches and within the courts.98
Finally, the world is currently facing a global pandemic which is
causing a world-wide economic crisis. Reflecting on the fiscal stabilizing
potential of the judiciary can equip governments with a broader spectrum
of tools they may utilize, in addition to the more traditional fiscal
stabilizers they have been implementing in attempt to slow down the
current deep recession. Therefore, I would recommend decision-makers
to take advantage of this opportunity and not overlook this stabilizing
fiscal potential of the courts.

98. Orli Oren-Kolbinger, Tax Judges’ Responses to Economic Crises: A Normative Analysis
(working paper, manuscript available upon request from the author).

